Abstract Deep inference is a natural generalisation of the one-sided sequent calculus where rules are allowed to apply deeply inside formulas, much like rewrite rules in term rewriting. This freedom in applying inference rules allows to express logical systems that are difficult or impossible to express in the cut-free sequent calculus and it also allows for a more fine-grained analysis of derivations than the sequent calculus. However, the same freedom also makes it harder to carry out this analysis, in particular it is harder to design cut elimination procedures. In this paper we see a cut elimination procedure for a deep inference system for classical predicate logic. As a consequence we derive Herbrand's Theorem, which we express as a factorisation of derivations.
Introduction
This work is part of a broader research effort which aims to develop and exploit a structural proof theory that is richer than the one provided by traditional formalisms like the sequent calculus or natural deduction. It is based on the formalism named calculus of structures, which is due to Guglielmi [8] and has the distinguishing feature of deep inference, meaning that inference rules apply deeply inside formulas. Deep inference systems so far have been studied for linear logic [14] , non-commutative variants of linear logic [11, 7] , classical logic [5] and several modal logics [12] .
The need for a richer proof theory comes mainly from computer science. It is well-known that the logical systems requested by computer scientists stretch the limits of expressivity of the traditional proof theoretical formalisms. The absence of cut-free sequent systems for some modal logics like S5, for many temporal and also for intermediate logics bears witness to that. Numerous extensions of the sequent calculus have been proposed in order to cope with some of these problems, such as the display calculus [3] , hypersequent systems [1] or labelled deduction [2] , just to name three approaches. The sequent calculus is also challenged by a very simple logical system wich is called system BV [8] and which is of relevance to computer science because its connectives resemble those of a process algebra. There is evidence that it can not be expressed in an inference system that does not employ deep inference [16] and thus the calculus of structures had to be developed in order to express this logic. One of the aims of the calculus of structures, namely expressing more logics than the cut-free sequent calculus, is shared with the extensions mentioned above. However, its approach differs significantly from the approaches of these other formalisms. Rather than enriching the set of structural connectives with respect to the sequent calculus, the calculus of structures gets rid of them: by simply using the logical connectives instead.
Deep inference systems for classical predicate logic were introduced in [5] . Cut admissibility for these systems is proved externally, namely by translating a proof into the sequent calculus, eliminating the cut in the sequent calculus, and translating back the cut-free proof. So the question arises whether there is a direct procedure for eliminating the cut, a procedure that does not make the detour via the sequent calculus. For the propositional fragment, there is such a direct cut elimination procedure, cf. [4] . However, in contrast to the situation in the sequent calculus this procedure does not trivially scale to predicate logic. Deep inference allows the cut rule to apply inside the scope of an existential quantifier, which turns out to be problematic for cut elimination. In the sequent calculus this situation does not occur, which is the reason why first-order quantifiers do not make much of a difference with respect to the difficulty of proving cut admissibility. However, in deep inference they constitute a problem, and a solution to this problem is the main contribution of this paper: a direct cut-elimination procedure for a deep inference system for classical predicate logic.
Since the sequent calculus is already very successful in the proof-theoretic analysis of classical predicate logic a fair question is: why study it in a new formalism? One motivation is that, in order to use deep inference to study extensions of classical logic that are not expressible in the cut-free sequent calculus, of course one should first understand the proof theory of deep inference systems for classical logic. But the main motivation is that the structural proof theory of deep inference systems for classical logic already differs significantly from that of the sequent calculus and thus deserves study as a new perspective on the important concept of cut elimination, or, more generally, on the normalisation of proofs.
Some desirable features of deep inference systems for classical logic are that they allow for shorter cut-free proofs than the sequent calculus [9] , that they allow to faithfully embed resolution derivations as cut-free proofs [10] , that they allow to observe the symmetry between cut and identity axiom and that they allow to decompose inference rules like cut and contraction into more primitive rules [8, 5] . A less desirable feature is that proving cut elimination becomes a significant challenge due to the loss of the main connective, which plays a crucial role in the sequent calculus. And that is the problem that I address in the present work.
The plan of the paper is as follows: I first introduce the deep inference system SKSgr, which is in some sense more restricted than the original system SKSgq from [5] . I then give a cut elimination procedure for that system and derive Herbrand's Theorem as a result. Finally I show how cut elimination for the original system SKSgq follows. The sequent calculus has two types of objects to deduce over, namely formulas and sequents. The inference systems that we will see will have just one type of objects, namely formulas. Since formulas have to play the role of sequents it turns out that the chosen outfix notation for connectives is more convenient than the standard infix notation.
Basic Definitions
S ::= f | t | a | [ S, S ] | ( S, S ) | ∃xS | ∀xS ,
Definition 2.
We defineS, the negation of the formula S, as follows:
Definition 3. An inference rule is written
where ρ is the name of the rule, S{R} is its premise and S{T } is its conclusion. R and T are formulas that may contain schematic formulas, schematic atoms and schematic contexts. An instance of an inference rule is obtained by replacing all schematic formulas, schematic atoms and schematic contexts by formulas, atoms and contexts, respectively. In an instance of an inference rule the formula taking the place of R is its redex, the formula taking the place of T is its contractum and the context taking the place of S{ } is its context. A (deductive) system S is a set of inference rules.
An inference rule is best thought of as a rewrite rule known from term rewriting. For example, the rule ρ from the previous definition seen topdown corresponds to a rewrite rule R → T .
Since formulas will have to play the role of sequents it will be convenient to equip them with an equivalence that is usually implicit in the notion of sequent:
Definition 4. The syntactic equivalence relation is the smallest congruence relation on formulas induced by commutativity and associativity of conjunction and disjunction, the capture-avoiding renaming of bound variables as well as the following equations:
Definition 5.
A derivation ∆ in a certain deductive system is either a pair of syntactically equivalent formulas or a finite nonempty sequence of instances of inference rules in the system, where inference rules are applied modulo the syntactic equivalence. They are written respectively as follows:
The topmost formula in a derivation is called the premise of the derivation, and the formula at the bottom is called its conclusion. The length of the derivation is the number of instances of inference rules. A proof is a derivation whose premise is the unit t. A derivation ∆ from R to T in S and a proof Π of T in S are respectively denoted by
Notation 6. We use [R, T, U ] to abbreviate [R, [T, U ]] and [ [R, T ]
, U ], and likewise for an arbitrary number of formulas in a disjunction. We do the same for conjunction. Given an inference rule ρ and a natural number n, ρ n denotes n instances of ρ and ρ * denotes n instances of ρ for some n ≥ 0.
Given two derivations such that the conclusion of the first is the premise of the second, we can compose these two derivations vertically in the obvious way. In addition we will also compose derivations horizontally, as follows.
Definition 7.
Given a derivation ∆ and a context S{ }, the derivation S{∆} is obtained by replacing each formula U in ∆ by S{U }. Given two derivations, ∆ 1 from R 1 to T 1 and ∆ 2 from R 2 to T 2 , we define (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ) as the vertical composition of (R 1 , ∆ 2 ) and (∆ 1 , T 2 ), and likewise for [∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ].
Definition 8.
A rule ρ is derivable for a system S if for every instance of ρ with premise R and conclusion T there is a derivation from R to T in S. A rule ρ is admissible for a system S if for every instance of ρ with premise R and conclusion T the existence of a proof of R in S implies the existence of a proof of T in S. Two systems S and S are strongly equivalent if for every derivation from R to T in S there is a derivation from R to T in S , and vice versa. Two systems S and S are (weakly) equivalent if for every proof of S in S there is a proof of S in S , and vice versa.
Definition 9.
Our inference system for classical predicate logic is named system KSgr, and it is shown in Figure 1 . 
The duality between the two is well-known under the name contrapositive.
System SKSgr, shown in Figure 2 , is the symmetric closure of KSgr. The collection of rules with an up-arrow are called up-fragment, their names are the names of their duals suffixed by "-up". The rule i↑ is also called cut.
Note that a symmetric system that contains the identity rule by definition contains the cut rule as well, so in general we can read "symmetric" as "contains cut". The notion of cut admissibility in deep inference is the admissibility of up-rules: in our case the admissibility of the rules i↑, w↑, c↑, r↑ and n↑ for system KSgr. In the sequent calculus, the identity axiom usually can be replaced by its atomic form without a change of derivability. The same is true for the identity rule and the weakening rule in our system, and by duality, also for The following proposition will allow us to conveniently assume that instances of the rule i↓ and w↓ are atomic:
The rules i↓ and w↓ are derivable for {ai↓, s, r↓} and {aw↓, s}, respectively. Dually, the rules i↑ and w↑ are derivable for {ai↑, s, r↑} and {aw↑, s}, respectively.
Similarly to the sequent calculus, the reduction to atomic form is achieved by inductively replacing an instance of the rule by instances on smaller formulas, details are in [5] .
Soundness, completeness and cut admissibility for system KSgr can be obtained by translating back-and-forth between its derivations and derivations in some one-sided sequent system. A detailed proof for system KSgq can be found in [5] and can be easily adapted for KSgr:
Theorem 13 (Cut Elimination). The rules i↑, r↑, w↑, n↑ and c↑ are admissible for system KSgr. Put differently, the systems SKSgr and KSgr are equivalent.
Our main goal in the next section is now to prove this theorem again, but this time without resorting to the sequent calculus.
Cut Elimination
The cut rule in the sequent calculus serves the purpose of composing proofs (when seen top-down) and the purpose of splitting proof obligations (when seen bottom-up). The cut rule in the calculus of structures is different. Here, the familiar sequent calculus cut is broken into smaller pieces, as shown in Figure 3 .
Notice that the crux of the sequent calculus cut is isolated in the rule i↑: when seen bottom-up it introduces a formula A out of thin air. Notice also that the deep inference rules can be composed in a more flexible way than rules in the sequent calculus. For example we know that A andĀ in the sequent calculus proof will never interact because they are in different branches. This is not true in the proof in the calculus of structures, because the rule i↑ does not force a splitting of proof obligations. Also, the rule i↑ can introduce the cut formula together with its negation anywhere deep inside a formula, for example in such a way that an existential quantifier in the context captures a variable in the cut formula. This also is impossible in the sequent calculus.
This freedom in applying inference rules in the calculus of structures is a significant challenge for cut elimination. While a proof in the sequent calculus decomposes a formula starting from the main connective, a proof in the calculus of structures is more like a myriad of interacting particles, atoms and quantified formulas, swimming in a soup of propositional connectives. During cut elimination, the sequent calculus allows to get into the crucial situation where on one branch a logical rule applies to the main connective of the cut formula and on the other branch the corresponding rule applies to the dual connective of the dual cut formula. Since rules in the calculus of structures are not restricted to main connectives, Gentzen's technique of permuting up the (generalised) cut does not apply. For example, one cannot permute the cut over the switch rule.
A cut elimination procedure for the propositional fragment SKS of SKSgr has been presented in [4] . It uses the fact that the cut rule trivially reduces to atomic form, a standard feature of systems in the calculus of structures, in order to give an especially simple cut elimination procedure. In particular, it does not involve an induction on the cut rank. The problem of the greater freedom in applying inference rules is dealt with by splitting the proof above the cut into two separate proofs. Once this is done, the procedure is very similar to normalisation in natural deduction. It works like Tait-style cut elimination [15] : given a cut in the sequent calculus, as in the picture above, the left proof Π 1 says thatĀ implies Γ and the right proof Π 2 says that A implies Γ. To obtain a proof of Γ, Γ and thus of Γ we take Π 1 and replace A by Γ everywhere inside it. This process of replacement will break the proof at certain places, but wherever that happens we can fix the proof by plugging in Π 2 . In Taits procedure, which works in the sequent calculus, the proof breaks and has to be fixed in several cases, since rules apply to the cut formula. The procedure in [4] is so simple because there is just one place where the proof breaks: when the replacement reaches an identity.
The interesting question now is how this procedure for the propositional system scales to predicate logic. This question is nontrivial, mainly because existential quantifiers in the context of a cut prevent the splitting of the proof above into two separate proofs. In a nutshell, the solution we adopt here is to get rid of such existential quantifiers by trading them for bigger cuts. 
Given an instance of the cut rule with cut formula A, we define its cut rank as qn(A) + 1. The cut rank of a derivation is the supremum of the cut ranks of its cuts. For r ≥ 0 the inference rule is r ↑ is is↑ with the proviso that its cut rank is at most r.
This transformation allows us to replace up-rules by splittable cuts:
so we have
This transformation allows us to inductively replace splittable cuts by solid splittable cuts: Definition 17. A rule ρ is length-preserving admissible for a system S if for every instance of ρ with premise R and conclusion T for all n the existence of a proof of length n of R in S implies the existence of a proof of length n of T in S. Cut-rank-preserving admissible is defined in the same way, replacing length by cut-rank.
Splitting
During cut elimination in the sequent calculus one has access to two proofs above the cut such that the cut formula is in the conclusion of one proof and the dual of the cut formula is in the conclusion of the other proof. In the calculus of structures, we just have one proof above the cut and its conclusion contains both, the cut formula and its dual. This subsection is devoted to gaining access to two proofs as in the sequent calculus.
In a cut-free proof of a formula S(R, T ) rules can apply in many different chaotic ways. We now see a lemma, which tells us that for each such proof there is one in which inference rules apply in a certain orderly fashion. In fact, it can be split into two proofs, one containing R and one containing T :
S(R, T )
.
During cut elimination, the splitting lemma will be applied to the proof above the cut with R being the cut formula and T being the dual cut formula. This will make available a situation more comparable to the sequent calculus, where a cut splits the proof.
The splitting lemma presented here is inspired by a similar one used by Guglielmi for a substructural logic in [8] . However, the proof is very different.
Guglielmi not only splits the proof, but also the context. In the example above this means that U is split into two formulas: one that goes into the proof with R and another that goes into the proof with T . In classical logic we have contraction at our disposal, which means that instead of having to split U into two parts, which requires some work, we can simply duplicate it. Before we state the splitting lemma, we need two more lemmas.
Lemma 18. The weakening-up rule w↑ is cut-rank-preserving admissible for system KSgr ∪ {is↑}.
Proof. By Proposition 12 we it suffices to prove the lemma for atomic weakening-up. Consider a proof −
Starting with the conclusion of Π, going up in the proof, in each formula we replace the atom a, and its copies that are produced by contractions, and their instances that are produced by instantiations, by the unit t. Replacements inside the context of any rule instance leave this rule instance intact.
Instances of all the rules in KSgr ∪ {is↑} remain intact also in the case that atom occurrences are replaced by t inside redex and contractum, except for ai↓. We simply replace them by weakenings:
Lemma 19. The instantiation-up rule n↑ is length-and cut-rank-preserving admissible for system KSgr ∪ {is↑}.
Proof.
We proceed by induction on the length of the proof in KSgr ∪ {is↑}. The base case is easy: if the premise of n↑ is syntactically equivalent to t then so is its conclusion. To prove the induction step, consider a proof in KSgr ∪ {is↑} above an instance of n↑. Let ρ be the inference rule above n↑. We do a case analysis on the position of the redex of n↑ with respect to the contractum of ρ. If the redex is inside the context of ρ then n↑ trivially permutes up and the lemma follows from the induction hypothesis. Consider the case that it is inside a schematic formula of the contractum of ρ. Then ρ is one of s, c↓, r↓, n↓. In the case of c↓ we push up n↑ to obtain two instances of n↑ and apply the induction hypothesis twice. The case of s is trivial and so is r↓, where we possibly have to rename bound variables in order to respect the proviso of r↓. The somewhat tedious case is permuting n↑ up over n↓, where we have to check the variable conditions in the derivation on the right:
We can safely assume that differently bound variables have different names, so in particular we have that no variable from τ 1 occurs bound in R{∀yT } and that no variable from τ 2 occurs bound in T . From that we conclude the validity of the equalities and the instances of n↑ and n↓:
Consider now the case that the contractum of ρ is inside the redex of n↑.
Then it clearly has to be inside the schematic formula, so n↑ trivially permutes up over ρ, except when ρ = r↓, when we possibly have to rename a bound variable, and when ρ = n↓ when we have to check variable conditions, but this case is dual to the one that we considered above.
The only remaining case is that the active universal quantifier in the redex of n↑ matches an active universal quantifier in the contractum of ρ. This can only happen when ρ is r↓ and we apply the following transformation in order to apply the induction hypothesis: Proof. Let U = S {f}, where S { } is obtained from S{ } by removing all universal quantifiers that have the hole in their scope. We obtain the proofs and the derivation as follows:
Lemma 20 (Splitting
where w↑ and n↑ are eliminated by Lemma 18 and Lemma 19.
Eliminating Atomic Cuts
The cut elimination procedure we are after will first reduce cuts to atomic cuts and then eliminate the atomic cuts. However, I present cut reduction after the elimination of atomic cuts. The reason is that I want to see clearly that quantified formulas behave like atoms and both of them behave differently from propositional connectives. So the cut reduction for quantified formulas is the same as the elimination of an atomic cut, with just one additional difficulty: rules can apply inside the quantified formula, while rules cannot apply inside an atom. Since elimination of an atomic cut is the simpler case, I present it first.
Lemma 21 (Atomic Cut Elimination).

For each proof
there is a proof
Proof. We apply the splitting lemma to Π in order to obtain
Note that Π 2 proves that a implies U . We thus replace a inside Π 1 by U in order to obtain a proof of [U, U ] and thus of U . Starting with the conclusion, going up in proof Π 1 , in each formula we replace the atom a, and its copies that are produced by contractions, by the formula U .
Replacements inside the context of any rule instance leave the rule instance intact. Instances of the rules s, c↓ and w↓ remain intact, also in the case that atom occurrences are replaced inside the contractum and redex. The same is true for r↓, where we possibly have to rename the universally bound variable in order not to violate the proviso. No replacement happens inside the contractum of a n↓ rule because in Π 1 no copy of a is in the scope of an existential quantifier. The interesting case is ai↓. We replace its instances by S{Π 2 }:
The result of this process of substituting Π 2 into Π 1 is a proof Π 3 , from which we build −
Cut Reduction
Cut reduction is very similar to the elimination of an atomic cut, except that replacing a compound cut formula of the form ∃xR is a bit more involved than replacing an atom, because inference rules apply inside R. We will accomplish this replacement by pushing up a special inference rule which keeps track of these inference rules.
Definition 22. An n-context is a formula with n occurences of { }, and a splittable n-context is an n-context in which no hole is in the scope of an existential quantifier. Given a proof Π of [U, ∀xR] in KSgr ∪ {is↑} and some n ≥ 1 we define the inference rule plug Π,n as
where S{ } . . . { } is a splittable n-context and for all i ≤ n there is a derivation ∆ i in KSgr from R i toR.
Lemma 23 (Cut Reduction).
For each proof
Proof. Just like in the case of an atomic cut, we apply the splitting lemma on Π to obtain −
Note that Π 2 proves that ∃xR implies U . The idea is thus to replace ∃xR inside Π 1 by U in order to obtain a proof of [U, U ] and thus of T {f}. More formally, we will obtain a proof of T {f} by eliminating plug from −
We push plug to the top until it disappears. Pushing it up over the propositional rules and over r↓ and is↑ is easy: they cannot affect the active existential quantifiers in the premise of plug. So either plug trivially permutes up or, if the rule above applies inside one of the R i , it is added to ∆ i . The interesting case is n↓. We push plug up as follows:
where we obtain a derivation ∆ i [x/τ ] by applying the substitution [x/τ ] to each formula in ∆ i and a proof Π 2 by applying n↑ to Π 2 and eliminating it by using Lemma 19. We can safely assume that all bound variables in Π 2 and in ∆ i are distinct from variables in τ .
Once plug reaches the top, its premise S{∃xR 1 } . . . {∃xR n } is equivalent to t. Since no atoms can occur in a formula that is equivalent to t, there are two cases to distinguish: 1) all of the R i are equivalent to f, or 2) at least one of the R i is equivalent to t. In the first case we can simply replace the instance of plug by instances of weakening:
and in the second case we directly build a proof of T {f} as follows:
where we obtain Π 2 by adding an instance of n↑ in the obvious way to Π 2 and eliminating it by using Lemma 19.
Now we can give a proof of cut elimination, i.e. of Theorem 13, without any reference to the sequent calculus:
Proof. By Lemma 15 we just need to show that for each proof
We eliminate instances of is↑ in two phases:
Phase 1 By induction on the cut rank of the proof. First replace all cuts by solid cuts by Lemma 16. Then, by a subinduction on the number of maximal-rank cuts, choose the topmost and apply the cut reduction lemma. The result is a proof with a cut rank of at most one.
Phase 2 First reduce all cuts to atomic cuts by Lemma 16. Then, by induction on the number of atomic cuts, choose the topmost and apply the atomic cut elimination lemma.
Herbrand's Theorem
A weak version of Herbrand's theorem immediately follows from Gentzen's Mid-Sequent Theorem which in turn immediately follows from cut elimination. I will prove the strong version of Herbrand's theorem cf. [6] , which also can be proved without difficulties by using cut elimination in the sequent calculus. I will tune the deductive system a bit in order to present a factorisation of proofs from which the strong version of Herbrand's theorem immediately follows, in the same sense as the weak version follows from the Mid-sequent factorisation of proofs in the sequent calculus. This is of course impossible in the sequent calculus, since the restriction of rules to the main connective does not allow to represent the expansion and prenexification phase of a Herbrand proof.
In order to prove Herbrand's theorem one needs to keep track of existentially quantified formulas that are duplicated. In our setting we do so by decomposing contraction, i.e. we inductively replace contraction by the following rules: We define system KS as {ai↓, aw↓, ac↓, s, m}. It is easy to check that it is strongly equivalent to system KSg, i.e. the propositional fragment of KSgr. For details see [5] .
In order to represent the prenexification phase in a Herbrand proof, we define a generalised retract rule:
where Q{ } is a sequence of quantifiers and P { } is a propositional context such that no variable in P { } is bound by a quantifier in Q{ } in the premise.
Theorem 25 (Herbrand's Theorem). For each proof of a formula S in system
SKSgr there is a is a substitution σ, a propositional formula P , a context Q{ } consisting only of quantifiers and a proof given in Figure 4 at the right.
n↓,r↓,ai↑
The proof of Herbrand's Theorem
Proof. Given the proof in SKSgr, we apply Lemma 15 and cut elimination to get a proof in KSgr∪{ai↑}. The first phase of the procedure is sufficient since atomic cuts make no difference for Herbrand's Theorem. By Proposition 24 we decompose contraction to get a proof in KS ∪ {cq↓, m 2 ↓, n↓, r↓, ai↑}. From here, we get the factorisation of the proof that we are after by three phases that are shown in Figure 4 .
Phase 1
We push all instances of cq↓ down to the bottom of the proof starting with the bottommost instance, and proceeding by induction on the number of instances of cq↓. To push down one instance of cq↓ we proceed by induction on the number of rule instances below.
Consider an instance of cq↓ together with one rule instance ρ ∈ KS ∪ {m 2 ↓, n↓, r↓, ai↑} below it. If the contractum of cq↓ is inside of a schema of ρ (i.e. a subformula of the schematic context S{ } or of the schematic formulas in the redex), then cq↓ trivially permutes down. Since the contractum of cq↓ cannot overlap with the redex of ρ the only remaining case is that the redex of ρ is inside of the schematic formula in the contractum of cq↓. We apply the following transformation:
Phase 2
We factor the upper proof into a derivation in {gr↓} transforming a formula into prenex normal form and a proof in KS ∪ {n↓, ai↑} which contains prenex formulas only. In the following the Q 1,2,3 { } denote sequences of quantifiers. We assume that differently bound variables have different names and their names are different from the names of free variables. Given a formula S, S p denotes the formula obtained from S by removing all quantifiers.
We proceed by induction on the length of the given proof. The induction base is trivial. The induction step is trivial for the propositional rules and for r↓, which is a special case of gr↓. To prove it for the rules involving quantifiers, apply the following transformations:
as well as
We eliminate the instance of n↑ using the same procedure as in the proof of Lemma 19.
Phase 3
To get the final result we now push down instances of n↓. We proceed by induction on proof length. The base case is trivial, as is the induction step since besides n↓ only propositional rules are left and contraction is restricted to atoms.
Cut Elimination for the Original System
System KSgr was designed for cut elimination, i.e. it is tailor-made to allow for an easy proof of cut elimination. In this section we prove cut elimination for two variants of this system. The first variant, named system KSguv, is designed for minimality: the rule r↓ in KSgr is a bit stronger than what is needed for completeness and can be weakened. The second variant, named SKSgq, is the original deep inference system for predicate logic and has been presented in [5] . It mainly differs from the other systems in allowing to freely introduce and discard vacuous quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers that do not bind any variables.
Definition 26. Let KSguv be the system KSgr \ {r↓} ∪ {uv↓}, where uv↓ is the rule
where x is not free in T .
To show the equivalence of KSgr and KSguv we first need a lemma.
Lemma 27. The rule cq↑ is admissible for system KSguv.
Proof. We eliminate cq↑ by pushing it to the top, where it disappears. It can happen that an instance of cq↑ is duplicated when we push it up over contraction and it may also duplicate the rule instance above it. To cope with this, we generalise cq↑ into a rule which keeps together multiple instances of cq↑ and keeps track of the depth of their nesting. The rule is parameterised by a natural number m, its rank, and is defined inductively as follows:
if for all the R i that occur there are m , m which are smaller than m such that
We refer to the formulas ∀xR 1 . . . ∀xR n as the redeces of the rule and to the corresponding formulas in the conclusion as the contracta. Clearly, cq m ↑ is derivable for cq↑ and cq↑ is a special case of cq 1 ↑.
We now prove the claim that for each derivation
Admissibility of cq↑ then follows by inductively applying the above claim on the topmost instance of cq m ↑ in a given proof and the fact that an instance disappears once it reaches the top of a proof. We prove the claim by induction on the length of ∆. Consider an instance of cq m ↑ together with one instance of a rule ρ ∈ KSguv above it.
If all redeces of cq m ↑ are either subformulas of the schematic context S{ } or of the schematic formulas in the contractum of ρ then the transformation is trivial:
Now assume that at least one redex is not inside a schema of ρ. In that case either the contractum of ρ is 1) inside of one of the schematic formulae R 1 . . . R n or 2) it is not. Consider the first case, in which we do a subinduction on the the rank m. The induction base is trivial. To prove the induction step consider as given
We first obtain two derivations ∆ i by applying the subinduction hypothesis as follows:
, which proves the subinduction step.
Now consider the second case. Here, the active universal quantifier in a redex of cq m ↑ matches an active universal quantifier in the contractum of ρ, which is only possible if ρ = uv↓. We assume that cq m ↑ has exactly one redex, as all other redeces, if there are any, have to be inside schemas of ρ and can trivially be permuted. We apply the following transformation: Proof. The direction from right to left is obvious for both statements. For the other direction, consider the first statement. To prove it we need to eliminate instances of the rule r↓ and r↑ from the proof in SKSgr by possibly introducing instances of uv↓. We replace instances of r↓ by the following derivations:
and
S(∀xR, T )
, and we replace instances of r↑ by duals of these derivations. Note that cq↑ is just a special case of c↑. To prove the second statement we replace instances of r↓ as just outlined and eliminate instances of w↑, n↑ and cq↑ simultaneously, starting with the topmost, by using Lemma 18, Lemma 19 and Lemma 27.
Having proved the equivalence of system KSgr and the more restricted system KSguv we now go on to prove equivalence of system KSguv and system KSgq, which was the first inference system for predicate logic in the calculus of structures [5] and the starting point for these investigations. System SKSgq allows to freely introduce and drop vacuous quantifiers:
Definition 29. System KSgq is obtained from KSgr by replacing the rule
and by strengthening the syntactic equivalence by adding the following equation: ∀yR = ∃yR = R if y is not free in R .
System SKSgq is obtained from KSgq by adding the dual of each inference rule.
The seemingly innocent ability to introduce vacuous quantifiers together with the ability to instantiate existentially quantified variables deep inside a formula allows to build the following derivation in KSgq, i.e. in the cut-free system: ∀y 1 ∃z 1 . . . ∀y n ∃z n p(f (y 1 , z 1 , . . . , y n , z n )) n↓ ∀y 1 ∃z 1 . . . ∀y n ∃z n ∃yp(y) = v ∃yp(y) .
Here, going up in the derivation, the logical complexity of the formula increases. That is certainly not what we expect from a cut-free system. Here we have tension between the desire to comfortably write down proofs, e.g. dropping vacuous quantifiers at will, and comfortably carrying out prooftheoretical investigations, e.g. having something like the subformula property. For the second statement, from left to right, we proceed as in proving the first statement. From right to left, we obtain a proof in SKSgr as in the proof of the first statement and then apply cut elimination, i.e. Theorem 13 to obtain a proof in KSgr.
By cut elimination for system KSgr and the theorem above we get Theorem 31 (Cut Elimination for System KSgq). System SKSgq and system KSgq are equivalent.
Conclusion
We have seen a cut elimination procedure inside a deep inference system for classical predicate logic. The calculus of structures for classical predicate logic now stands on its own feet, so to speak, as a proof-theoretic formalism: it does not rely on the sequent calculus to prove cut elimination. Since a cut-free deep inference system does not technically have the subformula property, it is a fair question whether it indeed deserves the name "cutfree". The fact that we have easily obtained Herbrand's Theorem from our cut elimination result provides some evidence for a positive answer. Also, the techniques presented here can serve as a basis for native cut elimination procedures in deep inference systems for modal logics like S5. Current cut elimination results for these systems are based on hypersequents [13] .
This work does not close the chapter on cut elimination in deep inference for predicate logic. The lemma that turns cuts into splittable cuts makes these cuts shallow at the cost of potentially increasing a lot the cut rank. It is a somewhat unnatural operation in a deep inference system. It would be interesting to make the cut elimination procedure work in the presence of existential quantifiers in the context of a cut. This seems possible and is likely to involve a factorisation as in Herbrand's Theorem as a part of the cut elimination procedure. It would also be interesting to see a cut elimination procedure that works directly on SKSgq.
Proof complexity is a natural direction for future research. As already happens in the propositional case [9] , the ability of applying inference rules deep inside of formulas allows for shorter proofs. The question is whether it also leads to a hyperexponential speedup for proofs in predicate logic.
